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Introduction  
 
Privative clauses are essentially a legislative attempt to limit or exclude judicial intervention in a certain field.  
They have been deployed by parliaments over many years for a variety of apparent reasons – a desire for finality 
or certainty, a concern about sensitivity or controversy, a wish to avoid delay and expense, or a perception that a 
matter requires specialist expertise and/or awareness of executive context.  Yet a common response from 
observers is that a broad and undiscerning use of such legislative devices promotes temporary and specific 
convenience, and perhaps political expediency, over fundamental legal values.   
It has long been acknowledged
2
 that to accompany the conferral of a specified public function with a privative 
clause appears to be a contradiction. Parliament is on the one hand conferring (probably well-defined) functions 
and powers, whilst also providing in effect that the recipient may act however it wishes free from judicial 
supervision and control.  The contradiction here is not a trivial one.  The Diceyan conception of the rule of law sits 
squarely in one corner
3
 and is easily agitated in a system where the executive not only holds administrative 
power but also tends to dominate the legislature.
4
  Moreover, even the vaguest notion of a ‘separation of powers’ 
suggests that there should ultimately be some limit on ouster of judicial intervention in executive decision-making.  
Yet by the same token, the principles of parliamentary supremacy and the floating ideals of a parliamentary 
democracy suggest that a clear legislative intention should be respected.  Not surprisingly then, the history of 
privative clauses in Australia is a history of acute legal tension.  The courts have long read such clauses 
narrowly, often reciting the relevant foundational legal tenets and presumptions about non-interference with rights 
or access to the judicial system.
5
  Yet, perhaps inevitably, the resistance has been somewhat conceptually 
scattered.   
The principal means by which the courts have evaded privative clauses are discussed in the first section of 
this chapter.  However, it is important to note at the outset that privative mechanisms vary and continue to evolve, 
and hence constantly present new challenges to judges.  There are some reasonably common formulations, for 
example a direction that any decision by a body is final and conclusive and not to be challenged, appealed or 
questioned in any court.  However, many other versions that have been tried, refined and combined over the 
years – ultimately shading into broader legislative drafting practices that might not immediately seem privative in 
nature.  The various devices employed,
6
 beyond the clause which simply declares finality and/or prohibits judicial 
challenge, include restrictions on specified remedies, restrictions on available grounds of challenge, confinement 
or redirection of review jurisdiction, ‘conclusive evidence’ provisions, ‘no-invalidity’ type provisions, provisions 
declaring things to have effect ‘as if enacted’, and time limits. 
The expanding constitutional entrenchment of ‘jurisdictional error’ review (particularly via the decision in Kirk 
v Industrial Court (NSW)
7
) has bought the mechanisms for ouster (direct and de facto) back to centre stage.  How 
will these devices work in the new constitutional context?  There has been a rush of academic interest here 
because a number of roads – practical, legal, political and theoretical – now converge at this particular point in 
administrative law.  The pattern of recent commentary indicates that the natural response to Kirk perhaps 
proceeds through three stages of inquiry.  First, given that standard privative clauses are now unable to protect 
jurisdictional error from High Court or Supreme Court review, how else might parliaments achieve this?  
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Secondly, how might the courts legitimately respond to alternative attempts - ie, can the substance of the new 
constitutional protection be shored up in some way?  Finally, how hard should courts and academics be working 
to achieve this abstract reinforcement of review jurisdiction?  The discussion in this chapter will ultimately return 
to these matters, however first there is some background to traverse. 
 
 
Traditional Interpretative Techniques  
 
As indicated above, the courts have for the most part maintained an awkward but determined resistance to 
privative provisions.  The variety of techniques that have been employed in their reading down have been 
valuably mapped in the leading books in the field.
8
  At a basic level, clauses have commonly been restricted to 
their express scope – eg their protection confined to the named body (strictly defined) or upheld only against the 
named judicial remedies.
9
  Moreover, they have often been read down to their lesser viable operation.  For 
example, an ousting of ‘actions’, ‘proceedings’ or ‘appeals’, or indeed an immunity from ‘liability’, may be read so 
as not to protect the decision maker from judicial review.
10
  Similarly, basic ‘final and conclusive’ clauses have 
been read to exclude only appeal (rather than judicial review),
11
 and ‘no certiorari’ clauses have been held to 
protect only the lesser target of this writ, errors on the record.
12
  Of course the plaintiff may also have a part to 
play in the avoidance of a privative clause.  They may, for example, commence proceedings prior to the making 
of a determination that would be protected,
13
 or indeed refashion their arguments to target available remedies or 
grounds or to focus on particular unprotected aspects of the broader process in train (see below).   
Here, also, we find one of the most important functions of the amorphous concept of ‘jurisdictional error’: 
even broadly worded privative clauses have frequently been held not to protect such serious error.  This is an old 
methodology,
14
 recently described as ‘elegant in its simplicity’.
15
  A traditional explanation was that a purported 
ouster of review should not effectively render a power unlimited, by allowing a decision-maker to proceed without 
interference beyond the expressly defined jurisdiction.
16
  As will be seen, constitutional considerations ultimately 
broadly reinforced this approach.  Yet the traditional interpretative principle remains in the background, often 
manifested in (and implemented by) some variation on the basic logic that a clause declaring protection for a 
‘decision’ will not apply where there is jurisdictional error because the resulting nullity means there is no ‘decision’ 
to protect.
17
  Parliaments ultimately developed responses to this logic; most simply, privative clause protection 
was expressly extended to ‘purported decisions’.
18
  The High Court at one point cast some doubt upon the textual 
effectiveness of such an extension,
19
 but since appears to have acknowledged again its potential role in 
extending protection
20
 (subject of course to constitutional considerations
21
).     
There were always some conceptual difficulties with the ‘jurisdictional error’ approach.  For example, this 
interpretative technique was ill-fitting where a privative clause specifically named remedies that were only 
available for jurisdictional error.  More importantly, this close traditional (and contemporary) association between 
privative clauses and ‘jurisdictional error’ means that the former frequently become entangled in the uncertainties 
of the latter.  Of course the privative clause deserves no sympathy on this front.  As will be seen, migration 
privative devices themselves drove the unruly resurgence of the notion of jurisdictional error,
22
 after its relative 
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dormancy in the wake of the Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), the prevalence 
of the Hickman methodology as regards ouster in softer contexts, and the uncertainty emerging from UK 
developments.    
The Hickman methodology was a separate approach to privative clause interpretation,
23
 prominent in 
Australia for a long period, which drew the focus to a somewhat differently conceived supervisory bottom line.  
This approach involved (as we now understand it) a very strong presumption of reviewability when certain 
particularly serious errors were identified.  The 1945 decision in question
24
 concerned a privative clause relating 
to decisions of a coal mining industrial relations board.  Dixon J in his separate judgment had particularly 
emphasised that to determine the effect of such clauses it was necessary to reconcile the power conferring 
provisions with the terms of the ouster.  In his ensuing discussion the later courts found a formula to be applied in 
this context, which involved inquiry into whether the decision in issue was a bona fide attempt to exercise the 
power; was related to the subject matter of the legislation; and was reasonably capable of reference to the power 
conferred (ie does not on its face go beyond power).
25
  
These vaguely-worded provisos are best understood, from a contemporary viewpoint, as targeting a core 
selection of jurisdictional errors
26
 – sometimes called ‘manifest errors’.  This formula was keenly recited in 
decisions for many years,
27
 establishing a path of sorts through the privative clause dilemmas.  Yet this 
methodology faded somewhat in application and rationale over time,
28
 and its period of prominence has been 
remembered with varying degrees of fondness.  Moreover, there were variations (at least in emphasis) in 
important restatements
29
 and hence a lingering uncertainty over its precise effect.  Ultimately constitutional 
considerations began to dominate in this context at the federal level and prompted some re-focussing of thought.  
As will be seen, the High Court has now carefully explained that the Hickman principle is essentially just a 
construction aid to help resolve the statutory contradiction that comes with a privative clause,
30
 and indeed is only 
a first step in ascertaining the effect of such a clause (see below). 
The contemporary Australian jurisprudence and commentary on privative clauses was relatively slow in 
coming.  There was for a time a tendency to regard these issues as chiefly just the concern of industrial law 
(given the long prominence of privative clauses in that context).  Moreover, the significance of this drafting device 
was disassembled to some extent (initially at the federal level) by the enactment of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), which as discussed below contained a provision negating the 
operation of pre-existing privative clauses in other legislation and a mechanism by which classes of decision 
were excluded from review by the Act’s own schedule.  Yet obviously the traditional privative clause did not 
remain peripheral for long.   
 
Privative clauses and contemporary federal jurisdiction: Plaintiff S157 
 
From the early 1990s, accumulating controversies in the field of migration led to a series of Commonwealth 
legislative initiatives that began to significantly re-shape Australian administrative law.
31
  Federal parliament, as 
part of its rationalisation of migration processes, sought essentially to restrict the Federal Court’s extensive 
capacity (under ADJR Act and general law jurisdiction) to review decisions in the field.  The original strategy, 
essentially of substituting a scheme with constricted grounds,
32
 did not have great effect - owing to the courts’ 
generous interpretations and plaintiffs’ strategic re-fashioning of arguments (or engagement of the High Court’s 
own s 75(v) jurisdiction).
33
  In 2001 the legislature moved to a general, broadly-worded privative clause (s 474) 
that declared finality, prohibited challenge and excluded the key remedies in respect of ‘privative clause 
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decisions’ (broadly defined).
34
  The Commonwealth’s view was that this strongly worded clause should 
substantially confine judicial review, by limiting invalidity to actions which did not satisfy the Hickman provisos 
and thereby effectively expanding the relevant field of lawful activity.
35
  The underlying thinking here was that 
privative clause protection would always be effective where the Hickman provisos were met – reflecting the 
bolder reading of Hickman.   
The Commonwealth’s position initially gained some traction.
36
  However, the major High Court decision in 
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth
37
 would unseat much of this reasoning.  In these s 75(v) High Court 
proceedings alleging breach of natural justice by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), the plaintiff argued that the 
s474 privative clause was invalid in this constitutional setting (a possibility ultimately avoided), while the 
Commonwealth pressed its power-expansion reading of Hickman.  The High Court confirmed that the 
Commonwealth’s argument was an over-reading of Hickman, that the meaning of privative clauses must be 
ascertained from their terms and any necessary reconciliation with the power-conferring provisions, and that they 
did not (aided by Hickman) effect some automatic expansion of statutory authority or repeal of limits elsewhere 
stated (here in very expansive legislation).
38
  The Court indicated that satisfaction of the Hickman provisos was 
required for privative clause protection to attach, but would not necessarily be sufficient: the second step required 
a search for any (other) inviolable or essential requirements attaching to the power.
39
  Yet it was acknowledged 
that not every statutory limitation must be inviolable (with breaches incapable of protection).  The majority 
observed it may be, by reference to the particular scheme (including it seems the privative clause itself), that 
some requirements might be construed as not essential to validity.
40
  The idea behind this second step – a 
search for infringement of an inviolable or essential restraint – was not new.  This was arguably implicit in 
Hickman itself and further developed thereafter.
41
     
Having placed Hickman in its proper place, the Court in Plaintiff S157 noted that there were also other rules 
of construction in play here.  Citing the need to read privative clauses narrowly (based on presumptions about 
parliamentary intentions), and more critically the need to interpret them consistently with the constitution where 
possible, the joint majority arrived at a somewhat traditional textual restriction of s 474.  It was held that a 
decision involving jurisdictional error was not a ‘privative clause decision’ to which s 474 attached.
42
  The 
constitutional difficulties attending a broader interpretation of the clause, noted here by the Court, were 
significant.  It is well accepted that the Commonwealth parliament may not deprive the High Court of its 
constitutional jurisdiction under s 75(v)
43
 (in essence the supervision of jurisdictional error).  Whatever the varied 
original purposes behind s 75(v), this ‘accountability’ function of the provision dominated its later history.
44
  
Moreover, significant constitutional difficulties pursue any attempt by federal parliament to confer upon an 
administrative body a power to conclusively determine the limits of its own jurisdiction.
45
   
The joint majority in Plaintiff S157 returned then to the notion of a ‘reconciliation’ of the statutory provisions, 
as a means of determining whether some failure constitutes a jurisdictional error (thus outside s 474 protection).    
However, their Honours quickly so classified the breach of natural justice claimed here, simply based on earlier 
precedent.
46
  Interestingly, Gleeson CJ proceeded further on this path - noting that the question of whether an 
RRT decision in breach of natural justice was unprotected by the privative clause depended on a construction of 
the statute as a whole, which here made it clear that this was a breach of an indispensable condition on the 
power.
47
  This late methodological divergence between Gleeson CJ and the joint majority was maybe not just a 
matter of judicial stamina.  The lead-up reasoning of all of these judges obviously reflects some conflation of the 
search for ‘essential’ limitations and the notion of jurisdictional error,
48
 but while this association is ever more 
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49
 it is one which is as yet incomplete given the ongoing influence of the pre-mixed formulas from 
Craig v South Australia
50
 and presumptions about the status of certain errors.  The latter were on display here in 
Plaintiff S157 in the joint judgment.  At base, this divergence is perhaps a lingering tension between what may be 
termed ‘internal’ (ie derived from the statute at hand) and ‘external’ conceptualisations of jurisdictional error.  To 
some extent this is an old dichotomy, lining up with the well-worn debate between ‘ultra vires theorists’ (who 
emphasise statutory boundaries) and ‘common law theorists’ (who emphasise the deeper historical and 
conceptual roots of the law).
51
  Yet it would seem that this opposition might be heavily implicated in the very 
contemporary uncertainty over jurisdictional error.  And it is very relevant to emerging questions about how 
legislatures can respond to the constitutional entrenchment of jurisdictional error review, and indeed how courts 
can respond to those responses. 
The Plaintiff S157 Court also read down a time limit on High Court review proceedings (s 486A – similarly 
attaching ineffectively to a “privative clause decision”).
52
  Yet subsequently, in Bodruddaza v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
53
 the Court examined an amended s 486A that clearly sought to cover 
jurisdictional error and hence brought the constitutional issue into sharper relief.
54
  The new s 486A was ruled 
invalid as subverting the constitutionally entrenched right under s 75(v) to seek review before the High Court.  
According to the Court,
55
 the determination of validity here required consideration of the substance or practical 
effect of the provision, not merely its form - and in this respect reference was made to potential difficulties which 
applicants may face in identifying reviewable errors within the time frame set for appeal.  This perhaps proved to 
be the high point of the High Court's shoring up of its territory in this context.  Amendments which attempted to 
restrict the High Court's power of remittal (in a complicated confinement of review options) were subsequently 
ruled valid by the High Court in MZXOT v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship.
56
  Arguments about undue 
burdens on the High Court and constitutional implications failed.
57
 
The s 75(v) backstop has some important limits.  One point worth emphasising is that the reach of this 
jurisdiction, and hence the federal supervisory guarantee, is limited by the notion of ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ 
and remains of uncertain application in the context of corporatised and outsourced federal activity.
58
  A point of 
broader significance is the uncertain position of the Federal Court post Plaintiff S157.  Notwithstanding its varying 
role in migration over recent years, the Federal Court is a key player in judicial review more broadly (including via 
its general law jurisdiction). Yet while the traditional textual confinement of s 474 was very relevant to Federal 
Court matters (at the time),
59
 that Court is not a direct beneficiary of much of the constitutional reasoning in 
Plaintiff S157 (or indeed in the Kirk decision on state Supreme Courts discussed below).  Obviously the Federal 
Court has a range of traditional interpretative tools at its disposal for the evasion of privative clauses, however it 
may not be easy to find for it some greater protection of its judicial review function.
60
   
It should also be remembered in any consideration of the Federal Court that its ADJR Act jurisdiction (albeit 
no longer significant in the migration context
61
), was initially reinforced by the inclusion of a provision
62
 effectively 
negating for AJDR Act purposes the operation of pre-existing privative clauses (ie those enacted before 1 
October 1980).  The significance of this provision has obviously declined with the passage of time.  Moreover, the 
AJDR Act has a ‘Schedule 1’ (now sizeable) which operates to expressly exclude various classes of decisions 
from ADJR Act review – including a broad swathe of migration decisions.
63
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Privative clauses and contemporary state jurisdiction: Kirk 
 
Following Plaintiff S157, there was deliberation on the relevance of this decision to the operation of privative 
clauses at state level.
64
  The traditional interpretative mechanisms obviously continued to apply, and the Hickman 
principle was generally assumed to have a role,
65
 but inevitably there was discussion of grander potential 
restrictions on state legislative ouster.
66
  There was quite a distance to travel here.  In Australia there was a 
reasonably settled assumption that skilled state drafting could produce a privative clause that did effectively 
exclude review of jurisdictional error.  A passage from Darling Casino Ltd v New South Wales Casino Control 
Authority, identifying only the narrower Hickman standard as the ultimate supervisory preserve, is often referred 
to in this regard.
67
  And this thinking lingered.  In the post-Plaintiff S157 New South Wales decision of Mitchforce 
Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales,
68
 Spigelman CJ referred to Darling Casino and 
noted that at state level the Hickman principle operated “by a process of statutory construction without 
constitutional overlay”.
69
  So while a privative clause clearly seeking to protect jurisdictional error would run 
aground in the federal (s 75(v)) context,
70
 it was thought that a state equivalent may be more effective.
71
  
Constitutional arguments directed to the state position were on the radar by the time of Mitchforce
72
 – building on 
dormant principles from Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).
73
  Yet it was some years before such 
arguments, in an evolving form, attracted the courts' full attention. 
These questions arrived squarely before the High Court in the 2010 case of Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW).
74
  
This case had various important implications for state law, but most importantly was a significant advance in the 
collaboration between administrative law and constitutional law in Australia.  In effect, the High Court replicated 
for state Supreme Courts the constitutional protection afforded to its own s 75(v) jurisdiction.  This major step 
perhaps should not have been unexpected,
75
 and indeed was predicted by some,
76
 but nonetheless it has 
produced a surge of busy legal and theoretical reflection not seen since the native title and free speech cases of 
the 1990s.  In administrative law terms Kirk goes some way towards closing a circle as regards the resilience of 
judicial review jurisdiction in Australia.  However, in constitutional law terms it is part of a broader story.  The 
emerging constitutional personality of state Supreme Courts is now being keenly explored and debated.
77
  
Kirk concerned an occupational health and safety prosecution in the New South Wales Industrial Court.  The 
proceedings were potentially protected by a privative clause declaring such decisions final and prohibiting judicial 
intervention by any relief or remedy (s 179 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW)).  In the first place, the 
High Court joint majority
78
 found the proceedings to be flawed by reason of a lack of particularisation in the 
statement of charges
79
 and the prosecution’s calling of Kirk as a witness (contrary to Evidence Act restrictions).
80
  
It was concluded that both of the identified errors were ‘jurisdictional errors’.
81
  From that point, it was determined 
that the Supreme Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over the errors was constitutionally protected.  The Court 
confirmed that Chapter III of the Constitution requires there to be a body fitting the description ‘Supreme Court of 
a State’.  It is beyond the power of a State, it was said, to alter the constitution or character of its Supreme Court 
so it ceases to meet the constitutional description.
82
  Most importantly, and more controversially,
83
 it was said that 
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a defining characteristic of state Supreme Courts is the power to confine inferior courts and tribunals within the 
limits of their authority via the grant of relief on grounds of jurisdictional error (which is ultimately subject to High 
Court supervision via s 73 appeals).
84
  Particular reference was made in this context to ‘accepted doctrine’ at the 
time of federation, the importance of this Supreme Court review function as regards state executive and judicial 
power, and the fact that loss of this supervision would create ‘islands of power’ immune from supervision and 
restraint.  Consequently, the court declared that a state privative clause which purports to strip the Supreme 
Court of this function of correcting jurisdictional error is beyond state legislative power.
85
   
The High Court majority ultimately took its new constitutional principle, as well as the traditional tools of strict 
textual interpretation, back to the privative clause in issue and concluded that it should be read down:
86
 s 179 did 
not (and could not validly) exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant relief via certiorari, prohibition or 
mandamus to enforce the limits of the Industrial Court’s statutory authority.  For the purposes of this case then, it 
did not on its proper construction exclude certiorari for jurisdictional error. 
As adverted to above, the constitutional foundation of Kirk (in fact its reliance on both the history and 
constitutional text) has been questioned.  And some point out that this is a further promotion of the judiciary over 
the executive and legislature (when even the protection accorded to s 75(v) jurisdiction, on which Kirk builds, sits 
awkwardly with its original purposes).
87
  Yet ultimately few seem to question the prospective worth of Kirk, and 
the High Court would be highly unlikely to ever relinquish the public law symmetry is has now achieved through 
replication of the s 75(v) constitutional guarantee.  Former Chief Justice Spigelman has described the result in 
Kirk as a matter of ‘gravity’; the product of ongoing constitutional ‘pull’ upon state administrative law.
88
 
Subsequent lower court decisions have begun exploring the various implications of the Kirk decision, as 
regards prosecutorial and evidentiary practice and of course State legislative capacity.  In the latter regard, Kirk 
might seem to have delivered a death blow to the old assumption that determined state parliaments could 
exclude review of jurisdictional error.  The decision in South Australia v Totani confirmed
89
 that bolder 
contemporary drafting techniques, such as the extension of privative clauses to ‘purported decisions’, now suffer 
the same difficulties in the state Supreme Court context as they do in the context of original High Court review.  
However, as will be seen, there are deeper issues to be explored here as regards the manner in which 
‘jurisdiction’ might be defined by legislatures.  The High Court took a further small step into these issues in the 
recent case of Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA),
90
 
reading a limited express exception to the protection of a state privative clause (namely an exception for ‘excess 
or want of jurisdiction’) as including a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  It was said that the reading of such 
provisions must take into account the incapacity of states to take from Supreme Courts their authority over 
jurisdictional error; and that the expression in issue was ‘apt to include jurisdictional error, rather than merely 
some species of jurisdictional error.’
91
  The High Court’s handling to date of more sophisticated legislative 
manipulation of ‘jurisdiction’ is considered below.    
What is left of the old Hickman principle?  Following Plaintiff S157 (and before the constitutional override 
arrived at the state level), important state cases had applied the aggregated Hickman approach: privative clause 
protection was apparently understood to depend on upon satisfaction of the Hickman provisos and compliance 
with any inviolable or ‘essential’ limitations.  In Mitchforce
92
 for instance, Spigelman CJ found that a boldly-
worded privative clause protected a serious error of a state Industrial Relations Commission - on the basis that 
the error was not in breach of the Hickman provisos or any inviolable limit.
93
  Yet following Kirk, it seems that 
Hickman (with its focus on a narrow category of particularly serious error – now only a subset of jurisdictional 
error it seems) is of little relevance at state level because the effectiveness of a privative clause turns essentially, 
for constitutional reasons, upon the existence (or not) of jurisdictional error.  Obviously Hickman had been 
similarly undercut in the federal (s75(v)) context by Plaintiff S157.  However its emerging redundancy was clearer 
in Kirk.  By the time of Kirk the bolder, constitution-evading reading of Hickman could no longer be viably 
pressed.  And moreover, while the Plaintiff S157 court no doubt had in mind the need to preserve and re-
rationalise the pre-constitutional interpretative principles for the sake of the Supreme Courts and Federal Court, 
                                                 
84
  (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 566–7, 580.  The principle clearly extends to executive decision-making more broadly. 
85
  (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 566–7, 581. Protection of non-jurisdictional error (including that appearing on the face of the record) is not beyond 
power (at 581). 
86
  (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 581–2. 
87
  Eg Ronald Sackville, 'The constitutionalisation of state administrative law' (2012) 19 AJAdminL 127 at 129ff.  
88
  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 77. 
89
  (2010) 242 CLR 1 esp per French CJ at [26]ff.  Cf Wainohu v State of New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [15].     
90
  (2012) 289 ALR 1. 
91
  (2012) 289 ALR 1 at [60], [65] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (hence questions of invalidity per se did not arise: at 
[53]). 
92
  Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2003) 57 NSWLR 212. 
93
  (2003) 57 NSWLR 212 at [92]ff.  Cf Maitland City Council v Anumbah Homes Pty Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 695.   
there was far less need for this in Kirk.      
Hickman may remain as an echo to remind us of the seriousness of the errors it identified (and the courts’ 
historically uncompromising approach in that context).  And indeed it may retain a theoretical presence via the 
remote possibility that some error might prove to be not ‘jurisdictional’ but still fall foul of its provisos.  But 
certainly it can no longer offer to drafters and decision-makers the possibility of a ‘safe harbour’
94
 for all but these 
serious errors (which as noted above was always a brave reading).  Importantly however, if the constitutional 
guarantee of jurisdictional error review does not somehow leak through to the Federal Court, one implication is 
that this court may conceivably provide a final refuge for the Hickman methodology (albeit in its clarified form). 
As in the case of the federal (s 75(v)) guarantee, some interesting issues arise as to the precise reach of Kirk 
beyond traditional public sector boundaries.  There is not, in the state general law context, a cornerstone phrase 
such as ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ to be interpreted (or perhaps reinterpreted) for these purposes.  However, 
there are common law principles concerning the application of judicial review in private sector contexts (arising 
particularly from decisions such as R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin plc
95
), which remain 
at present surprisingly unsettled in Australia context.
96
 
Finally, the handling of the notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ in Kirk is an interesting (albeit less-discussed) aspect 
of the decision.  The joint majority explored with some candour the tension and uncertainty that attends the 
concept.  They discussed the touchstone decision in Craig v South Australia,
97
 with its generic formulas for the 
identification of such error,
98
  but emphasised that there is no ‘bright line test’ and that Craig provided not a rigid 
taxonomy but just examples.  Yet ultimately the Court did not stray far from the formulas of Craig, identifying 
jurisdictional errors in the mistakes alleged (lack of particularisation and evidentiary breaches) simply in terms of 
those formulas.
99
  This juxtaposition of predictive formulas and admissions of uncertainty might just reflect that 
the Court was focused on bigger issues and perhaps concerned to preserve flexibility in this field.  Alternately, it 
might reflect the fact that the errors here returned the Court to the harder end of the jurisdictional error 
classificatory task,
100
  after the matters before it had for some years accumulated around reasonably well-worn 
categories.  Yet going one step further, perhaps the reasoning here echoes with the same important conceptual 
tension that seemed to be visible in Plaintiff S157; a tension between the ‘internal’ (statute and context-specific) 
conceptualisation of jurisdictional error and the ‘external’ (pre-mixed or predictive) one.   
 
 
Alternative mechanisms for restricting judicial review 
 
These questions about the nature of jurisdictional error are fast losing their abstraction.  In the wake of Kirk’s 
extended entrenchment of ‘jurisdictional error’ review, attention has been firmly focussed on what parliaments 
might now do to redefine ‘jurisdiction’ (or remove substantive limits on powers).  And following this closely is the 
issue of how the courts might respond – are there limits on such legislative efforts?  These are now the ‘important 
imponderables’.
101
  Answers might begin to emerge in the abstract, but ultimately in the examination of these 
dilemmas it will be necessary to place them back in their fuller political and institutional context.   
The legislative devices that might carry on the work of the traditional privative clause include ‘no-invalidity’ 
clauses, the exclusion of grounds, the imposition of time bars or procedural obstacles, or simply the conferral on 
decision-makers of more broadly-stated powers and discretions.  Some of these options are now being termed 
‘plenary provisions’ by some – ie mechanisms for excluding substantive limits on power.
102
  Beyond the more 
obvious ouster devices, with a broader sweep we could include strategies such as the wider use of ‘subjective 
jurisdictional facts’ or ‘jurisdictional opinions’ (to lessen the judicial scrutiny of compliance with jurisdictional 
conditions), or indeed the ‘outsourcing’ of decision-making (to tap into lingering uncertainty on the reach of 
judicial review).
103
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Moreover, the hobbled traditional privative clause may continue to play an indirect role.  It may for example 
conceivably be an indicator that a jurisdictional condition is a subjective one (ie entrusted in large part to the 
decision-maker’s judgment).
104
  More importantly, on one view it is a legitimate participant in the reconciliation of 
provisions that delimits the unprotectable category of ‘jurisdictional error’ in the particular context.  The logic of 
such an approach was apparently acknowledged in Plaintiff S157
105
 and (albeit less clearly) in Kirk.
106
  This 
methodology has been doubted in some quarters – perhaps in part because it carries echos of the discredited 
reading of Hickman.  Yet an approach that acknowledges a privative clause when identifying the precise 
jurisdicitonal tipping point
107
 would seem to be quite different to an approach that reads such a clause as an 
automatic expansion of jurisdicition out to the limits of a narrow pre-set class of serious error.  Perhaps the more 
important problem with this methodology, as Aronson and Groves have noted, is the difficulty of finding actual 
examples of its application.
108
   
The courts’ likely responses to the various drafting devices noted above, in the contemporary constitutional 
and political climate, are not in all cases obvious.  The no-invalidity clause – declaring that specified errors or 
failures do not affect the validity of a decision – has been a particular focus in the post-Kirk commentary.  Such a 
clause might seem to side-step constitutional constraints (by redefining jurisdictional limits on a power rather than 
ousting judicial supervision), and has in recent cases drawn a more moderate response from the High Court than 
privative clauses.  In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme,
109
 the 
nature of the procedural error in question (failure to comply with a succeeding obligation to give reasons) and a 
clause declaring that such failure did not affect the validity of the actual decision (a visa cancellation) prompted 
the majority to conclude on a Project Blue Sky analysis
110
 that the failure did not impeach the decision for 
jurisdictional error (in s 75(v) proceedings).  A similarly soft context presented itself in Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd,
111
 where in the face of a carefully constructed appeal regime the Court held 
that a more generally targeted ‘no invalidity’ clause (re non-compliance with the relevant Act’s provisions) meant 
that errors to which it was directed did not go to jurisdiction (so as to attract a writ under s 75(v)).  There was 
however some reading down of the term ‘assessment’ (to which the no invalidity provision applied); importantly it 
was said to exclude ‘conscious maladministration’.
112
    
There is a general consensus in the commentary that there must be a limit to the effectiveness of a ‘no 
invalidity’ clause.  Beyond the possibility that it might logically not protect against correction or containment in 
some way of lesser ‘unlawfulness’,
113
 it would seem there can be little doubt that an Act can effectively declare 
that breach of a particular statutory requirement does not affect validity – as one observer has pointed out such a 
provision appears to merely state expressly the intention that would be searched for in a Project Blue Sky 
analysis.
114
  Indeed such deliberate legislative focus on identifying the essential and inessential conditions on a 
power might seem to be a productive way forward.
115
  However, a general validation (for any error) raises more 
interesting issues.
116
  For one, it is conceivable that the deeper-set conventional review grounds might not be so 
easily buried (see further below).  More broadly, it has been suggested (for example) that ‘no invalidity’ and 
privative clauses are the same in practical effect
117
 and the determination of validity is itself an essential part of 
the constitutionally protected judicial role,
118
 or that the constitutional notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ cannot be 
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‘hollowed out’ and that parliaments at both levels are at least prevented from conferring a power without limits 
sufficient to render it ‘non-arbitrary’.
119
  The possibility that the expanding constitutional dimension of 
‘jurisdictional error’ somehow alters its meaning, or produces a new variant of the concept, has been raised not 
infrequently in recent years.  However, there appear to be differing views on whether this new dimension draws 
the old concept away from its foundations in basic statutory interpretation,
120
 or pushes it further in that 
direction.
121
    
The device of excluding specific grounds is one with which all administrative lawyers – particularly those 
working in migration – are familiar.  Natural justice (or at least the fair hearing rule) has on occasions been pulled 
out at the roots in a legislative scheme (ie declared in some manner not to apply).  It is not an easy drafting 
exercise,
122
 but there has been little doubt that fair hearing principles can be so excluded from administrative 
decision-making processes.  The recent Western Australian decision in Seiffert v Prisoners Review Board
123
 
answered a constitutional objection to this in the state context with the explanation that it defines the duties of the 
decision-makers’ rather than seeks to oust supervisory jurisdiction.  This history of the important ground of 
natural justice casts a sizeable shadow over attempts to elevate other grounds to some higher status.   
Aspects of natural justice and other grounds have been expressly excluded at the point of defining 
permissible challenges – most notably (albeit not with great effect) in respect of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction 
under the 1990s migration regime.  It seems a simple provision declaring that a decision ‘may not be challenged 
on ground X’ will run into difficulties since Plaintiff S157 and Kirk (in the High Court and State Supreme Court 
contexts respectively), if ‘ground x’ is determined to be a jurisdictional error in the circumstances.  Similar 
considerations arise where a clause excludes review except for certain grounds (and the exception is insufficient 
to cover with the constitutional guarantees of review).
124
   However, draftspersons are now perhaps less likely to 
contemplate such provisions.  More difficult is the scenario where a no-invalidity clause is attached to a particular 
ground (or the limit inherent in the ground is otherwise somehow substantively removed).  As indicated above, 
instinct might tell us (now with an uncertain constitutional tinge) that some grounds have deeper footings, that 
they reach somewhat beyond the specific statutory terms and intentions.  However, most grounds are closely 
attached to statutory terms – making their extrication from statutory intent (including a no-invalidity clause) 
difficult.  Moreover, as a number of observers have noted for some time now,
125
 if some grounds are destined for 
higher status, which ones and why?  And could the select list (and the grounds themselves) still evolve?   
The High Court has given some signals in this context.  As noted above ‘conscious maladministration’ was 
set apart to some extent in Futuris (which is particularly relevant to arguments of bad faith).  In Plaintiff S157 
reference was made (in the context of the conventional privative clause there) to the continued availability of 
injunctive relief under s 75(v) for ‘fraud, bribery, dishonesty or other improper purpose’.
126
  However, the 
reasoning relied in part upon the first proviso of Hickman (in its re-rationalised form) and Hickman’s operation 
beyond conventional privative clauses might be unpredictable.  Moreover, the Court’s reference to the possible 
constitutional invalidity of the clause (should Hickman fail to preserve High Court supervision over such matters) 
was perhaps simply a reminder that the s 75(v) cannot be removed – rather than an indication that the limits on 
the decision-making power below cannot be re-defined.  Yet perhaps the comments in Futuris, and the reference 
there (in the context of a no invalidity clause) to the comments in Plaintiff S157, do take ‘conscious 
maladministration’ of these various types some way towards a special status.
127
  Aronson and Groves note that 
such status might also logically attach to errors that need correction in order to prevent a failure of the 
demarcation between laws or regulatory bodies.
128
  Of course in the case of decisions made and powers 
exercised by actual courts, constitutional principles potentially attach more directly to shore up conventional 
administrative law limits. 
With respect to the imposition of time bars or other practical obstacles to review (the former being particularly 
important in the state context), the courts do appear to have the recipe for a principled response.  These devices 
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pose a lesser conundrum given that they would apparently simply be seeking to obstruct the constitutionally 
guaranteed jurisdictional error review, rather than undermine it by any redefinition of ‘jurisdiction’.  In the High 
Court decision in Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
129
 the sequel to Plaintiff S157, 
the Court looked to 'whether directly or as a matter of practical effect' the time bar provision in issue so curtailed 
or limited the right or ability to seek relief under s 75(v) that it was 'inconsistent with the place of that provision in 
the constitutional structure’.  The Kirk decision might seem to allow such a methodology to be readily transposed 
for the state context.  However, it must be remembered that the courts (prominently at state level) have a long 
history of some tolerance of time bars (pre-Kirk).
130
  Moreover, the federal constitutional guarantee may not 
necessarily operate in exactly the same way in the state translation.
131
   
Obiter from the High Court decision in Plaintiff S157 raised some further possible responses to broad ouster 
devices.  It was suggested that the conferral of too open-ended a power might lack the ‘hallmark of the exercise 
of legislative power’, namely the determining of ‘the content of a law as a rule of conduct or a declaration as to 
power, right or duty’.
132
  Even if sufficiently extreme cases presented themselves, unfortunately such a 
proposition drops us into some perennial jurisprudential debates about the notion of ‘law’ that may have no exit.   
The difficulties of such an approach have been well canvassed by commentators such as McDonald
133
 and 
Bateman.
134
  It was also observed in Plaintiff S157 that a federal power conferred in too open-ended a manner 
may thereby lack connection with a constitutional head of power, and that this was something a court might not 
repair without rewriting the statute (not a judicial function).
135
  Yet the point might seem to be somewhat 
hypothetical given that an open-ended conferral of power could usually offer up the connection to a constitutional 
head without detracting much from its purpose of evading administrative law limits.  Another separation of powers 
argument of relevance here is the well-cited but underexplored notion that parliament cannot confer on a non-
judicial body the power to conclusively determine the limits of its own jurisdiction.
136
  Once again, the reach and 
usefulness of this idea in the context of broad attempts at ouster has been questioned,
137
 and of course all 
separation of powers arguments necessarily lose much in any translation across to the state level. 
One point to emphasise, at this stage of the debate, is that the construction of alternative appeal or review 
rights in conjunction with the attempted ouster (eg as in Futuris) appears to strengthen the legislature’s position 
on many of the arguments outlined above.
138
  For example, it perhaps evades a characterisation of the power as 
‘arbitrary’, makes it harder to suggest that the parliament has conferred a power to ‘conclusively’ define 
jurisdictional limits, and might conceivably avoid the fundamental constitutional opposition by retaining an 
ultimate path back to superior court supervision.
139
     
 
Conclusion 
As Justice Sackville has noted, the ‘field of conflict’ between courts and parliaments has shifted.
140
  The High 
Court has drawn and extended a constitutional bottom line, protecting for itself and for state Supreme Courts their 
jurisdiction over ‘jurisdiction’.  The challenge for legislatures now it seems is to disentangle themselves from old 
drafting habits (and the vague search for Hickam’s lost ‘safe port’), and to look for space within the constitutional 
guarantees to effect substantive removal of administrative law limits and the redefinition of ‘jurisdiction’.  The task 
for courts, it seems, is to devise responses.  This task is not a small one.  Is the protected court role to enforce 
the limits of jurisdiction or to define them?  Is it to ensure that parliament’s design is respected or to ensure 
compliance with some particular methodology or standard?  And from where and how will any unassailable 
administrative law limits be derived?  Some sizeable theoretical, precedential and practical dilemmas crowd into 
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these questions.  However, as noted at the outset of this chapter, a third dimension has appeared in the debate.  
While the administrative lawyer naturally tends to assume that there will be wild new legislative attempts at 
ouster, and proceeds from the position that there must be clear limits, questions are now being asked about the 
appropriateness of these starting points. 
Can we assume that legislatures will necessarily press hard on the constitutional guarantees in inappropriate 
circumstances?  In the first place, the clarity of drafting required in any attempted ouster or removal of 
substantive limits (and the likely context of such attempts) may well ensure that the legislature’s design is 
exposed to a very real political and public scrutiny.  It should also be remembered that the evasion of courts by 
the construction of undefined powers will often come at some expense to the clarity and security of the underlying 
political purposes, and to administrative coherency and efficiency.  Moreover, it is possible that our predictions 
about future legislative tactics might be skewed somewhat by the administrative extremes of recent times.  The 
intractable political controversies in migration have in the last two decades produced an unprecedented raw 
interplay between politics and law.  This recent context should be kept in mind as regards the motives and will 
that we attribute to the Australian legislatures more generally. 
The arguments for a robust judicial response to legislative ouster, direct or indirect, have been well-
rehearsed in this field of law – drawing as they do upon some fundamental tenets of our legal system.  Yet there 
are also factors which suggest that some caution is in fact appropriate here.  First, as mentioned above, the law 
has certainly already imposed on parliaments (in various ways) the requirement that their desire to depart from 
significant administrative law conventions must be expressed with ‘irresistible clearness’,
141
 and no doubt the 
usefulness of this methodology is not yet exhausted.  The same might be said of the mechanism of statutory 
‘reconciliation’.  Whatever broad attempt at ouster is dropped in, administrative law is skilled at finding implied 
purposes and limits on power which might well invite some ‘reconciliation’ and hence rationalisation of the ouster 
mechanism. 
It should also be remembered (against our Diceyan instincts) that effective legislative ouster of judicial review 
does not necessarily leave executive power in an accountability vacuum, even where specific appeal avenues 
have not been provided.  It has been pointed out at the highest levels that in contemporary legal debates over 
executive performance we forget too quickly the potential of a diligent parliament and rigorous media, and the 
sophisticated oversight provided by proliferating integrity bodies.
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  Indeed we perhaps tend to overstate the 
purposes, capacity and effectiveness of judicial review in this regard, and the neutrality and universality of the 
standards and values it imposes.
143
  The temptation to do so has been great in recent years, given the contests 
faced by judicial review in the overbearing field of migration.  But again, we should be mindful of this recent 
context as we consider future responses to legislative ouster more generally, and particularly the size of the legal 
counterweight actually required.   
The maturing collaboration between administrative law and constitutional law in Australia is of considerable 
theoretical and practical importance, and the task ahead of giving it sustainable and practical meaning is a 
sizeable one.  Ultimately, there may need to be some acceptance that the ‘immutable’ constitutional jurisdiction 
must to some extent take its shape on a case by case basis.  There are potential risks in overstating the 
constitutional guarantee, and searching too determinedly and too abstractly for clear and fixed limits on 
legislatures.  Apart from the broad implications for governmental balances of power, as Justice Basten has 
recently noted there is a need to protect the ‘political legitimacy’ of the entrenched supervisory jurisdiction and 
avoid prompting a questioning of the judiciary’s own accountability.
144
   
 
 
 
                                                 
141
  Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 267 ALR 204 at [15]. 
142
  See eg RS French, ‘’The Executive Power’, Inaugural George Winterton Lecture, Sydney University, 18 Feb 2010; John McMillan, ‘Re-
thinking the Separation of Powers’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 423.   
143
  See further John Basten,‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ (2011) 85 ALJ 273. 
144
  John Basten,‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ (2011) 85 ALJ 273 at 294, 299. 
